The First Tranche

Thursday, January 19, 2012

Looking Beyond the Supervision-Outcome Relationship in World Bank Projects

Over the last few weeks, we have been exploring whether there are new insights to glean from the World Bank's massive evaluation dataset. The dataset consists of nearly 10,000 World Bank projects with discrete categorical ratings for variables such as 'Quality at Entry', 'Quality of Supervision', 'Bank Performance', 'Borrower Performance', and 'Project Outcome'. One of the advantages of the dataset is that it allows one to explore both the project-level and country-level determinants of project performance.

In this post, we set out to assess the impact of project supervision on final project outcomes as well as the relative influence of country-level factors, such as corruption and government stability. The first potential correlation we examined was between 'Quality of Supervision' (QOS) and final project outcome. Consistent with the approach taken in an earlier post on this blog, we converted the Bank's six-point QoS and project outcome measures into binary (satisfactory/unsatisfactory) variables. Because the large majority of World Bank projects recorded in the database took place between the years 1984 and 2009, we excluded all prior years from our analysis. All borrower countries that did not have QoS and project outcome data for 10 discrete country-years during this timeframe were also excluded, reducing the sample size to 72 countries. Remaining project QoS and outcome values were averaged separately at the country-year level; these country-year averages were then averaged at the country level. Each recipient country was thus assigned a pair of unique QoS and outcome ratings between 0 (unsatisfactory) and 1 (satisfactory), which are displayed on a scatter plot below.

The results were not surprising: better project supervision generally yielded better project performance. But what else might help determine the success of a project? We used data from the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide to assess several contextual factors that may compromise project supervision and/or project outcomes: corruption, government stability, democratic accountability, bureaucratic quality and socioeconomic conditions. Specific country-year scores for each indicator were averaged for the period 1984-2009.These five composite indicators were then compared to their respective QoS and project outcome scores.

Several interesting trends emerge for borrowers with at least ten years of project outcome data (92 countries total) and QoS data (72 total). Only the socioeconomic conditions indicator had a significant impact on the project supervision: the better the socioeconomic conditions in a given country, the higher the QoS. Other country-level factors, such as government stability, did not appear to significantly influence QoS scores.

We obtained stronger results in a similar analysis of project outcomes. Whereas the borrower government’s level of stability still has no apparent role in determining a project’s success or failure, all other factors seem to have an impact; better socioeconomic conditions, lower levels of corruption, relatively efficient bureaucratic instititutions, and higher levels of democratic accountability seem to increase the likelihood that World Bank projects will succeed. In fact, socioeconomic conditions seem nearly as important as QOS to a project’s final outcome rating.

Of course, these very simple regressions do not constitute definitive results. But our preliminary findings paint a picture familiar to many development practitioners: while supervision of aid projects is important, so too is understanding how general contextual factors shape the success and failure of projects.

This post was contributed by William & Mary students Dylan Murray ‘12, an AidData research assistant, and Chris Salvi ’12, an AidData intern.

Thursday, January 12, 2012

Do strong monitoring and evaluation systems and high levels of staff supervision make World Bank projects more effective?

Several weeks ago we released a short post announcing the release of a fresh dataset from the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), containing assessments of almost 10,000 World Bank development projects. In that post, we examined some basic descriptive statistics, breaking down project success by region and by year. Here we will delve a bit deeper and explore the possible linkages between Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation (QME), the Quality of Project Supervision (QPS), and project success. “QPS” measures the intensity of staff oversight during project implementation, while “QME” assesses the credibility of the project's performance indicators and data.

To assess project success, we convert the IEG's six-point measure to a binary variable, with one adjustment from our previous post. Instead of assigning projects rated by the Bank as 'moderately successful' to the satisfactory category, we assigned them to the unsatisfactory category. This procedure was undertaken to mitigate a potential upward bias in how the Bank evaluates its own projects.

The QME variable is divided into four categories in the IEG dataset: high, substantial, moderate, and negligible. Over two-thirds of projects were rated in the bottom two categories, indicating substantial room for improvement in QME. The graph provided below demonstrates a strong positive correlation between QME and project success.

Projects with high QME ratings were successful 93% of the time, while projects with negligible QME ratings were successful only 3% of the time. Further analysis might shed light on the nature of this relationship. For example, it may be the case that donors find it more difficult to create strong performance indicators and incrementally monitor project performance in countries with ineffective governance or deficient infrastructure. And this may, in turn, affect project performance.

The QPS indicator is measured on the same six point scale as the project outcome indicator, so we perform a similar process to transform it into a binary variable. We classify projects rated 'highly successful' and 'successful' as satisfactory, while we classify projects rated 'moderately successful', 'moderately unsuccessful', 'unsuccessful', and 'highly unsuccessful' as unsatisfactory. Overall, projects received high scores on the QPS indicator: 75% of projects qualified as satisfactory. This circle graph provided below compares (a) the number of cases in which a project's QPS score and final outcome measure corresponded, with (b) the number of cases in which these two indicator values disagreed.

Only 3% of projects with low levels of project supervision had a final outcome rating of 'satisfactory'. However, 27% of projects that received a 'satisfactory' rating on the QPS indicator received a final outcome rating of 'unsatisfactory'. This pattern suggests that effective supervision is a necessary, but insufficient, predictor of project success.

A more thorough analysis is needed to determine the precise linkages between the quality of monitoring and evaluation, the quality of supervision, and project success, but our preliminary results support the current emphasis on strengthening monitoring and evaluation systems and improving project supervision.

This post was written by Ben Buch and Doug Nicholson. Ben and Doug are AidData Research Assistants at the College of William and Mary.

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

Transparency in South-South Cooperation: Why Does it Matter?

Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, Argentina's President Cristina Fernandez,

Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff, and Bolivia's President Evo Morales look on

during the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) summit in Caracas.

Source: AP/ Ricardo Mazalan

"We have to create a new international system, and we're doing it…

The solution is in our hands. It's not in handouts from the North." –Hugo Chavez, 2009

The global development finance architecture is rapidly changing. Many low-income and middle-income countries and longtime recipients of Western aid are now engaging in a different form of development cooperation called "South-South cooperation." Broadly defined, South-South cooperation is an arrangement in which developing countries share knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet mutual development goals.

Venezuela, a country known for promoting strong integration of Latin American and Caribbean countries, is an active sponsor of South-South development cooperation (SSDC) activities (see Chart 1). Its Ministry of Petroleum and Mining is one of the leading institutional actors involved in SSDC activities. It oversees Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), a state owned oil company which offers oil to Venezuela’s partner countries on concessional terms and funds social programs.

Source: The Reality of Aid Management Committee, Special Report on SSC 2010

Venezuela also sponsors energy integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, channeling significant amounts of oil-related assistance to governments through the Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement, the Energy Treaty of ALBA, and Petroamerica. These programs have helped Venezuela curry favor with governments in the region, but they have also made the Chávez administration the subject of intense criticism for its apparent lack of transparency.

Consider Nicaragua. In 2007, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega decided that his government would join ALBA and Petrocaribe, a Petroamerica initiative. Through this arrangement, Nicaragua gains access to 27,000 barrels of oil per day, effectively getting half of its purchase back in low-interest, long-term loans. Venezuelan aid through ALBA also led to the creation of ALBA de Nicaragua SA (ALBANISA), a private company in Nicaragua that manages joint revenues between PDVSA and Petroleos de Nicaragua (PETRONIC). ALBANISA is not required to disclose its funds to Nicaragua´s National Assembly; oversight rests solely with the executive branch. Thus, an estimated $450 million in 2009 escaped public scrutiny.

Venezuela's unwillingness to disclose detailed financial information has aroused suspicions. TIME Magazine argues that the Ortega administration’s exclusive oversight of ALBANISA and ability to purchase private ownership of Nicaraguan companies has increased opportunities for corruption and political patronage.

But others argue that Venezuelan assistance, which may constitute as much as 50% of all official financial flows received by the government, has played a major role in improving living conditions in Nicaragua's rural areas. Dr. Alejandro Martinez Cuenca, who runs a think tank in Managua, points out that extreme poverty in Nicaragua declined from 17.2% in 2005 to 9.7% in 2009. He attributes this improvement to the fact that "the government has had access to unlimited resources from Venezuela, and these have gone toward the rural sector."

Transparency would, of course, give the Chávez administration an opportunity to counter its critics. It would also help the research community better understand the rapidly evolving paradigm of South-South development cooperation. But for the time being it appears that the intended beneficiaries of Venezuela's SSDC programs will be left to hold the Chávez administration accountable for results.

This post was written by Daniel Gamboa Galvez, a Visiting Research Associate at AidData, and Jaclyn Goldschmidt, an AidData Research Assistant.

Thursday, December 8, 2011

Assessing Donor Transparency Practices Outside of the DAC

As other First Tranche contributors have noted, Publish What You Fund’s 2011 pilot Aid Transparency Index represents a major step forward in the benchmarking of donor transparency practices. But what is it exactly that PWYF has accomplished with this latest index?

I would argue that one of most important contributions PWYF has made is to move the policy discussion beyond the simple question of “What information is available?” and towards the more fundamental question: “Is the information that should be available actually available?” PWYF sheds light on the latter issue with detailed data for 58 organizations from 45 countries/IGOs. Their assessment examines three dimensions of each donor organization: organizational, country and activity level. At each level, PWYF has determined whether the organization collects and/or publishes commonly available information items, such as policy documents, country strategies, and details on project planning, implementation and evaluation. The complete methodology is available here.

PWYF's pilot Index also draws our attention to an area where there is tremendous scope for improvement: benchmarking the transparency practices of development finance agencies outside of the OECD-DAC. PWYF and their CSO/university collaborators gathered data largely from DAC agencies, but their methodological approach lends itself to inclusion of non-DAC agencies. In fact, some of the initial groundwork has already been laid by Michael Hubbard and Pranay Sinha at University of Birmingham. In their “Non DAC Donor’s Data Availability Index,” Hubbard and Sinha investigate the depth and quality of non-DAC data already available from the AidData.org web portal. They also provide information about the sources of the records published by AidData.

Hubbard and Sinha, “Non DAC Donor’s Data Availability Index”

Given that primary sources of information have been identified and a strong methodology for measurement is in place, the table is set for an industrious graduate student, junior faculty member, or CSO to begin collecting non-DAC data that are comparable with the (mostly) DAC data included in the PWYF assessment.

My colleagues and I believe that including non-DAC development finance agencies in future benchmarking exercises would be a great service to the aid transparency policy discussion, as many of these countries (e.g. India, Mexico, and Russia) are currently establishing new agencies and working out how information will be gathered and published for years to come. Including these organizations in benchmarking assessments like PWYF’s 2011 Index would enable non-DAC agency leaders to track their own progress. It might also foster a bit of healthy competition.

Robert Mosolgo is an AidData Project Manager at the College of William and Mary. He oversees AidData's work with non-DAC development finance agencies.

Monday, December 5, 2011

Mapping World Bank Project Success Patterns in Afghanistan: Does the Spatial Distribution of Violence Matter?

“With networked research, all can help collect and share the data that is sorely lacking... We need more hands and minds to confront theory with evidence on major policy issues. This is the direction that I want the World Bank to take. This is democratizing development economics.”

- Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank Group,

speech delivered at Georgetown University, September 2010

B.K. Bangash / AP

The World Bank’s Open Data initiative has demonstrated—in spades—that universally accessible data can provoke new research questions and turn conventional wisdom on its head. However, for a variety of reasons, donors seldom release comparable project evaluation data. The scarcity of reliable project-level evaluation data has created an important gap in the aid effectiveness literature. While economists and political scientists have undertaken hundreds and hundreds of econometric studies to assess the impact of aggregate aid flows on various development outcomes, the research community still knows relatively little about the project-level determinants of successful donor-sponsored projects.

In a huge step forward for aid transparency, the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group recently published its entire store of approximately 10,000 WB project evaluations from the 1960s to present. And importantly, the Bank’s unique project identification system allows users to track individual database records back to project documents.

Shortly after the Bank released these records, we geo-coded all of the World Bank’s publicly available project evaluation data in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. By “mashing-up” these geo-coded data and other statistical sources, we may begin exploring the spatial determinants of aid effectiveness in Afghanistan.

To conduct an initial "plausibility probe" of the popular hypothesis that security is a key determinant of successful projects, we overlaid all geo-coded and IEG-evaluated World Bank projects from 2002-2007 with sub-national violence data from the Long War Journal.

The resulting map reveals a puzzling pattern. The spatial distribution of violence and project performance do not correspond as closely as one might expect. Conventional wisdom holds that aid projects are generally less successful in conflict-affected areas. But this map suggests that many failed World Bank projects actually cluster in the relatively less violent provinces north of Kabul. Additionally, this map calls attention to the fact that a fair number of World Bank projects succeed in the country's most violent southern provinces, e.g. Kandahar and Helmand.

Several explanations may account for this unusual pattern. Projects in the most dangerous provinces may receive a higher level of donor supervision (since they are located in areas where "the stakes are highest"), which previous research identifies as an important predictor of project success. It could also be the case that donor supervision is lower in these areas, which makes it easier for local officials to avoid micro-management from Western capitals and tailor projects to local needs and conditions.

The key point is that aid effectiveness scholars cannot answer a puzzling question like this one until they know it exists. This is why we have expressed great enthusiasm for the World Bank's ambitious effort to "liberate" development data and promote "networked research". Finally, we should acknowledge that more comprehensive, time-series data from all donors in Afghanistan would provide a much stronger empirical basis for systematic hypothesis testing. A recent pilot project in Malawi strongly suggests that geocoding the universe of aid is feasible when donors agree to disclose detailed project documentation. However, mobilizing the necessary political will and capacity necessary to ensure that project evaluation documents are placed in the public domain will likely prove far more challenging. The latest Publish What You Fund benchmarking exercise demonstrates that only a handful of donors receive high scores on evaluation disclosure practices.

Brian O'Donnell is an AidData Post-Baccalaureate Fellow at the College of William and Mary. Brad Parks is Co-Executive Director of AidData and Research Faculty at the College of William and Mary.

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

Making Open Data Work for the Poor

Shortly after the recent AidData/CCAPS/WBI event, the World Bank’s Shanta Devarajan reviewed four critiques of the open data movement. His summary is insightful and we commend it to readers. Here we would like to push a few of his ideas a bit further. In particular, his third point — “there is limited evidence that information improves outcomes” — deserves further consideration.

The evidence that open data leads to better outcomes is indeed limited and contradictory. For example, one innovative study found that community-level information dramatically improved health outcomes in Uganda, while a concurrent Indonesian study found that an informed public had little effect on perceived government corruption.

Dr. Devarajan writes “the main reason for the paucity of evidence on outcomes is that the underlying service delivery failure is political, and it is difficult to disentangle the effects of information on the political system.”

We agree. In many developing countries, domestic political barriers likely "short-circuit" the relationship between better information and better development outcomes. After all, how can informed citizens get better development outcomes if their demands go unheard?

Two studies are under construction at AidData that will address this issue head-on. These randomized control trials will introduce interventions that (1) solicit citizen feedback on development outcomes and (2) take the feedback directly to the desks of relevant policy-makers.

In the first experiment, we plan to test how well user-level feedback can improve a government’s delivery of needed services. In certain treatment groups, the user-level feedback on service shortages will be sent directly to the government officials in charge of distribution. By comparing outcomes from this group with the control-group results, we will see whether direct information delivery can significantly enhance outcomes. In the second study, user-level feedback on specific projects will be sent directly to the donor-level project managers.

The purpose of these experiments is to learn whether, when, and how user-level information can be used to improve service delivery among both governments and donors. Our hope is that champions of the open data movement will use – and expand on – our results to sharpen their strategies for using user-level aid data.

Information is power, and it may improve development outcomes – if applied correctly. Political barriers are not insurmountable, but innovative approaches to using open development data will be essential. Our latest work will take several steps in this direction. We urge others, especially at the user level, to take on this important question: How can we make open-source data really work for the poor?

This post was written by Dan Nielson, an AidData Principal Investigator and Director of the Political Economy and Development Lab (PEDL) at Brigham Young University, and Dustin Homer, an AidData consultant.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Introducing AidData 2.0

Today, AidData launched its new and improved website, featuring more content and new data and marking an expansion in the program’s mission and scope. What began as a project to build a new kind of development assistance database has evolved into a broader initiative that aims to increase the accessibility and relevance of development finance information for a wide range of stakeholders. The new website highlights innovative projects to find new ways of gathering, managing, and visualizing development finance information, such as geocoding and crowdsourcing. Maps that show the geographical distribution of specific donor-funded activities offer a powerful way to help decision makers and citizens ask the right questions about aid allocation and effectiveness.

AidData Dashboards - coming soon

Those looking for data will find many new resources on the AidData site. AidData Raw is a new repository of stand-alone datasets that have not yet been vetted for inclusion in the main AidData database. It includes geo-location, project evaluation, and non-DAC donor datasets, as well as links to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) registry of aid activities. AidData 2.0 also includes a new collection of replication datasets associated with influential aid allocation and effectiveness studies, and many other new datasets for researchers. Soon, dashboards for key sectors will be added to the site, highlighting key trends and actors, and connecting activity-level data with other relevant resources.

In addition, the main AidData database has been updated to include the latest release of the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System data, and additional data sources, such as:

· African Development Bank (2009-2010)

· African Development Fund (2008-2010)

· Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development (2007-2010)

· India (2005-2010, Ministry of Finance & Ministry of External Affairs)

· Islamic Development Bank (1975-2008)

· Kuwait (2007-2009, Kuwait Fund for Economic Development)

· Latvia (2008-2010)

· Nigerian Trust Fund (2007-2010)

· Poland (2007-2010)

· Saudi Arabia (2005-2009, Saudi Fund for Development)

· United Arab Emirates (2008-2010, Abu Dhabi Fund for Development)

The new website was first previewed at an event on Nov. 4, organized by AidData, the World Bank Institute, and the Robert S. Strauss Center forInternational Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin. Putting Aid Data to Work: Using Better Information to Get Better Results was a day-long event that brought policymakers, technologists, development practitioners, and researchers together to discuss the open data movement and how it is impacting development work. In his keynote address, Richard Manning—former chair of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee—set the context for the day’s discussions. He noted that the transparency agenda was largely absent from the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness framework, but that then-President of the World Bank James Wolfensohn had emphasized it at the 2003 Rome High Level Forum, and it has since reemerged as a major theme. Mr. Manning argued that "infomediaries," such as AidData, will play a key role in making the deluge of public data more accessible and understandable.

Aleem Walji, World Bank

The discussion continued with a distinguished opening panel, including Catherine Weaver, Associate Professor, University of Texas and CCAPS Program as the moderator; and panelists Aleem Walji, Practice Manager, Innovation, World Bank Institute; Sheila Herrling, Vice President, Department of Policy and Evaluation, Millennium Challenge Corporation; David Wheeler, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development; Lindsay Coates, Executive Vice President, Interaction; and Jean-Louis Sarbib, Chief Executive Officer, Development Gateway.

Mr. Walji talked about the need for “hyper-local” data—and that putting data in the public domain allows outsiders to find uses for it that the original institution may never have considered. Demand for the data may not be obvious ex ante, but following the example of Andrew Carnegie, he argued that “sometimes you have to build the libraries before you build literacy.”

Ms. Herrling and Ms. Coates discussed the broad range of stakeholders involved in making aid information more available, including donor agencies, legislatures, and civil society organizations. Dr. Wheeler gave practical examples of lessons learned from projects that sought to increase transparency, emphasizing that it is difficult to know beforehand who the audience for the information will be, but that demand surfaces during the process, and that project managers learn along the way how to adjust the project to meet the revealed needs of users. Mr. Sarbib concluded the panel discussion by summarizing key challenges facing those who aim to increase aid transparency: information needs to be complete, credible, and relevant, and sustainability is key—institutions must modify their behavior, not simply pursue one-off transparency initiatives.

Panel: Tracking Aid

Sessions throughout the day focused on ways of tracking aid information, monitoring climate change-related finance, and closing the feedback loop between donors and other aid stakeholders. A number of fascinating new initiatives to make aid information more useful as a tool for research, policymaking, and grassroots monitoring were demonstrated, and all presentations are available online, alongside the relevant speaker bios. A recording of the event will be posted online soon.

Steve Davenport and Brad Parks are the new Co-Executive Directors of AidData.

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

A fresh look at China as an aid donor

Axel Dreher and Andreas Fuchs recently published an article titled, “Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China’s Aid Allocation,” as part of the “Foreign Aid of Emerging Donors and International Politics” project funded by the German Research Foundation. In their paper, Dreher and Fuchs use econometric methods to test whether China’s reputation as a “rogue donor” is consistent with actual patterns in Chinese aid flows. The dataset used in the paper is a synthesis of several existing sources of Chinese aid information, including AidData’s China dataset, which is a compilation of statistics from The China Commerce Yearbook (中国商务年鉴) and the Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations & Trade (中国对外经济贸易年间).

Apart from sensitivity to political issues regarding Taiwan, the evidence suggests that Chinese aid is not overwhelmingly influenced by the country's commercial or political interests. Chinese aid allocation patterns seem to generally fall in line with the government’s non-interference policy. Dreher and Fuchs conclude that the use of the term “rogue aid”—see, for example, Moisès Naím's 2007 article in Foreign Policy magazine—to describe Chinese foreign aid is probably unwarranted. China, like DAC donors, uses aid to advance its strategic interests; however, it is more forthright about its policy that foreign assistance should benefit both the recipient country and the donor country.

The Dreher and Fuchs study also provides valuable information about trends in Chinese assistance; aid flows are tracked roughly from 1956 to 2006. Yet the authors admit that incomplete data limits the effectiveness of their study. They argue that greater transparency of aid flows (for more discussion of China and aid transparency, see a post from Monday on the Guardian’s Poverty Matters blog) would be beneficial to China, as it would help address concerns that China’s activities in the developing world are harmful.

This post was written by Austin Strange, a Research Assistant at the College of William and Mary.

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Publish What You Fund Launches Pilot Aid Transparency Index

Today, Publish What You Fund released its 2011 Pilot Aid Transparency Index. The index was developed with the goal of encouraging a higher level of transparency among aid donors. Fifty-eight donor agencies were ranked based on 37 different indicators. To compile the index, Publish What You Fund collected primary data on aid transparency levels, with support from civil society organizations in 34 countries.

The average score is 34%, while no donor scores above 78%, leaving the top quintile vacant. The 5 best performing donors are the World Bank, the Global Fund, the African Development Bank, the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the UK’s Department for International Development. Some of the worst performing donors, among others, include Spain, Portugal, Italy, the U.S. Treasury, Poland, Cyprus, China and Greece. The index indicates that the accessibility of useful aid information is low. Interestingly, some of the donors that are traditionally considered to be transparency leaders, such as Canada, New Zealand and Norway, received rather low scores.

In its assessment of the pilot index, Publish What You Fund concludes that greater aid transparency is an eminently achievable goal. Increased political commitment to making information accessible and engagement with the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standards are listed among the key recommendations. In its press release, Publish What You Fund calls on donors to improve their standing on transparency and accountability and highlights the importance of such efforts for the effective use of aid funds.

On Wednesday, Nov. 16, a launch event will be held at the Overseas Development Institute in the UK (12:30-14:00, GMT+00) and streamed live online. You can also read about the index from the BBC, the Financial Times, and the Guardian.

This post was contributed by Alexey Dorofeev, an intern at Development Gateway.

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Watch online – Friday, Nov. 4 – Putting Aid Data to Work: Using better information to get better results

The AidData team has been working with partners at the World Bank Institute and the Climate Change and African Stability (CCAPS) program to put together a great all-day event on open data and development, which will be hosted by the World Bank on Friday, November 4. Richard Manning, former Chair of the OECD-DAC, will give the keynote address by video. Then, a series of panel discussions will examine the aid transparency movement and how it is influencing development research and practice. We’ll hear from officials at donor agencies who are working on making aid information more available, mashable, and relevant. We’ll also hear from researchers who are looking into new ways to use aid information to assess aid effectiveness and allocation, with a special focus on climate change issues. Experts from a range of civil society organizations will also talk about how better information can empower citizens to be more engaged in the development process.

Specific initiatives discussed will include a pilot project by AidData, CCAPS, and the World Bank Institute working with the Government of Malawi to track all active aid within one country using interactive maps. The event will also mark the launch of AidData 2.0, with a sneak preview of the new AidData website and a new direction for the AidData program that focuses on transparency, innovation, and country and donor solutions for aid effectiveness.

For more information, including the full agenda and link to the live webcast, please visit the event website. We’ll be tweeting from @aiddata during the event and welcome comments using the #aiddata hashtag.

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